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the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments
INTRODUCTION
Although Congressional amendments to the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code' represented an effort to correct constitutional infirmities
found in Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon
Pipeline Company,2 the 1984 Amendments3 have compounded
rather than clarified the post-Northern Pipeline confusion.4 In
attempting to design a system that was workable as well as
constitutional, 5 Congress instead produced a jurisdictional "rou-
'11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1329 (1985).
2 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
4 See Kamp, Court Structure Under the Bankruptcy Code, 90 Cou. L.J. 203, 212
(May 1985) ("The 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments represent a regression in the quest for
a workable legal system.").
Several authorities have found the 1984 Amendments constitutional based on
their similarity to the Emergency Rule, which was upheld as constitutional by every
court of appeals that considered it. See notes 28-38 infra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Emergency Rule. See, for example, In re Tom Carter Enterprises, 44
BR. 605 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984) stating as follows:
Hence, the bankruptcy structure created by the 1984 Act is virtually iden-
tical to the system established under the reference rule. The seven courts
of appeal upholding the constitutionality of the reference rule thus provide
strong precedent by which to sustain the constitutionality of the new
system.
Id. at 609-10. See also In re Baldwin-United Corp., 48 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1985) (because § 157 is "essentially a Congressional enactment of the Emergency Rule,"
and because the Sixth Circuit upheld the Emergency Rule, that holding alone justifies
the constitutionality). But see In re Ass'n Grocers of Nebraska Coop., Inc., 46 B.R.
173, 175 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985) (§ 157(bX2Xf) is unconstitutional); In re Lawson, 42
B.R. 206, 216 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1984) (§ 157 is probably unconstitutional), rev'd,
Credithrift of America v. Lawson, 52 B.R. 369 (Bankr. D. Ky. 1985). The Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky continues to believe that § 157 is unconsti-
tutional, but is precluded from so holding. For a lengthy discussion of the court's
reasoning, see L.T. Ruth Coal Co., Inc. v. Big Sandy Coal & Coke Co., Inc., Case No.
84-00197, Adv. No. 84-0137 (Bankr. E.D. Ky., May 14, 1986).
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lette wheel," ' 6 at which the lower courts are trying to decipher
the rules of the game.
This Note will examine the jurisdictional controversies lead-
ing to the 1984 Amendments, the amendments themselves, and
the arising interpretive caselaw.
I. JURISDICTION PRIOR TO THE 1984 AMENDMENTS
A. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19787
The controversy over bankruptcy court jurisdiction began in
1970 with Congressional attempts to expand the court's jurisdic-
tional authority. 8 The House version of the bankruptcy bill
proposed full Article III status for bankruptcy judges. 9 Policy
considerations underlying this view included the desire to attract
the most highly qualified judges to the bankruptcy system, which
proponents argued the more limited Article I status would not
accomplish; the added flexibility that Article III bankruptcy
judges would create in the judicial system by being able to sit
in other tenured courts, whereas non-tenured judges may not;
and the desire to add more credibility generally to the bankruptcy
system.' 0 Furthermore, the House version was largely based on
the belief that anything less than an Article III court would fail
to pass constitutional muster."
The Senate version, on the other hand, sought a more limited
Article I status, 2 arguing that although a functionally independ-
ent bankruptcy court was needed, this could best be accom-
plished by designating bankruptcy courts as adjuncts of the
6 See Kamp, supra note 4, at 212 ("The image that comes to mind is the roulette
wheel-no one knows where any proceeding will come to rest.").
7 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101-1329).
1 See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.01[l][a] at 3-6 (15th ed. 1985). In 1970,
Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to enact
a proposal for amending the 1898 Code. It took eight years before a compromise could
be reached. See Butler, Foreword to COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY at VII.
9 See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 5963, 5983.
10 See id. at 5984.
" See id. at 5984-6000.
11 Congress is empowered to enact uniform laws on bankruptcies in U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
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Article III district courts.'3 The proponents of Article I tenure
feared the fragmentation of judicial power and the creation of
a permanent judiciary without adequate workload. 4 Also, the
Judicial Conference strongly opposed Article III status, perhaps
because all current bankruptcy judges would be mandatorily
retired within five years under the House version.'5
As a compromise, the Senate version was agreed upon, grant-
ing bankruptcy judges Article I status and giving jurisdictional
authority to the district courts.' 6 Section 1471 of the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code granted "original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
cases under title 11,"'' ' as well as "original but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11 or
arising in or related to cases under title 11,"118 to the district
courts.
B. The Northern Pipeline Decision
In 1982, a U.S. Supreme Court plurality decided that the
1978 Code's broad jurisdictional grants violated Article III of
the Constitution. 9 Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co.20 involved a contract and breach of warranty claim brought
in bankruptcy court by a Chapter 11 debtor.2' The defendant
challenged the constitutionality of the Code "on the ground that
the Act unconstitutionally conferred Art[icle] III judicial power
upon judges who lacked life tenure and protection against salary
diminution." 22 The plurality concluded:
that 28 U.S.C. § 1471 ... has impermissibly removed most,
if not all, of "the essential attributes of the judicial power"
11 See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5801-02.
14 See H.R. REP., supra note 9, at 5981-82.
'1 See id. at 5972-73.
16 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (repealed 1984).
17 Id. at § 1471(a) (repealed 1984).
11 Id. at § 1471(b) (repealed 1984).
'9 Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). (Justice
Brennan wrote the plurality opinion in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens
concurred. Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connor
joined).
Z' Id.
I d. at 56.
Id. at 56-57.
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from the Art. III district court, and has vested those attributes
in a non-Art. III adjunct. Such a grant of jurisdiction cannot
be sustained as an exercise of Congress' power to create ad-
juncts to Art. III courts.Y
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, in their concurrence, stated
that they would hold unconstitutional only the Bankruptcy
Courts' ability to determine an action based entirely on state
law issues. 4
The Court applied its holding prospectively and stayed its
judgment until October 4, 1982, in order to "afford Congress
an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt
other valid means of adjudication.... 25 This date proved to
be optimistic, and because Congress failed to act as the deadline
approached, the Court extended the stay until December 25,
1982.26 When Congress again failed to reach a decision and a
third stay was denied, the Judicial Conference of the United
States proposed a Model Emergency Rule, which was subse-
quently adopted in every jurisdiction upon the expiration of the
stay.27
C. The Emergency Rule
The Emergency Rule 8 was based upon the assumption that
Northern Pipeline had invalidated only Subsection (c) of 28
U.S.C. Section 1471, the jurisdictional grant to the bankruptcy
courts, and that jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and proceed-
ings was still validly placed in the district courts under section
1471(a)-(b).2 9 The Rule continued the jurisdictional scheme set
up in the 1978 Code, but added certain controls over the system
to comply with Northern Pipeline.
30
3 Id. at 87.
u Id. at 90-91.
11 Id. at 87-88. The case was decided on June 28, 1982.
2 See COLLIER, supra note 8, at 3-14 to 3-15.
27 See id.
The Emergency Rule is reprinted in full in COLLIER, supra note 8, 3.01[l][a][vi]
at 3-15 to 3-19.
See id. at 3-15.
" See text accompanying notes 32-34 infra for these controls.
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Although the Rule continued automatic referrals of jurisdic-
tion from the district court to the bankruptcy court, 3' the district
court was authorized to withdraw such referrals at any time.
32
The Rule also limited the types of proceedings in which the
bankruptcy court could enter final orders. 33 Finally, all orders
and judgments issued by the bankruptcy judge were subject to
de novo review by the district judge. 34
The Rule's constitutionality was promptly questioned. Sev-
eral early cases held the Rule unconstitutional, based upon the
perception that the district courts were doing by rule what Con-
gress must do by statute-i.e., find a legislative solution to
Northern Pipeline.35 Most commentators also found the Rule
invalid, questioning the Rule's assumption that section 1471(a)-
(b), granting district court jurisdiction, remained valid after
Northern Pipeline.3
6
Nevertheless, every court of appeals that considered the Rule
upheld its constitutionality, holding that Northern Pipeline had
indeed invalidated only the jurisdictional grant to the bankruptcy
courts and had left district court jurisdiction over bankruptcy
matters intact.3 7 Furthermore, a reason never enunciated, but
See Emergency Rule § (c)(1), reprinted in COLLIER, supra note 8, at 3-16.
See id. at § (c)(2).
" See id. at § (d)(3)(B). The Rule described "related proceedings" as "those civil
proceedings that, in the absence of a petition in bankruptcy, could have been brought
in a district court or a state court." Id. at § (d)(3)(A). In such proceedings, the
bankruptcy judge was to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to
the district court, unless the parties consented to an entry of judgment by the bankruptcy
judge. See id. at § (dX3XB).
-1 See id. at § (e)(2)(B).
11 See, e.g., In re Conley, 26 B.R. 885, 892-93 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983). See
also In Re Wildman, 30 B.R. 133, 153 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1983) (Rule is invalid); In re
Johnson County Gas Co., 30 B.R. 690, 704 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1983) (provision of Model
Rule denying debtor trial before Art. III judge on a counterclaim is unconstitutional);
Winters Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Schear Group, 25 B.R. 463, 470-71 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1982).
. See generally Countryman, Emergency Rule Compounds Emergency, 57 AM.
BANKR. L.J. I (Winter 1983) (rule is invalid and totally unworkable); Vihon, Delegation
of Authority and the Model Rule: The Continuing Saga of Northern Pipeline, 88 Com.
L.J. 64 (Feb. 1983) (questions validity of rule).
" See, e.g., In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574, 1580-81 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Braniff
Airways, 700 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 944 (1983); White Motor
Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 704 F.2d 254, 263 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Hansen, 702 F.2d
728, 729 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1208 (1983).
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surely weighed in these decisions, was that the Emergency Rule
was the glue holding the entire system together until further
Congressional action was taken."
II. THE BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS AND
FEDERAL JUDGESHIP ACT OF 1984
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
went into effect on July 10, 1984. 39 The Act is divided into three
titles: Title I sets up a new bankruptcy court system to accom-
modate the Northern Pipeline decision; Title II creates eighty-five
new district and circuit court judgeships; and Title III makes
several substantive changes in the Code.4°
Two principal provisions govern original jurisdiction. 4' First,
section 1334 establishes the district court jurisdiction.4 2 The lan-
guage is identical to that in former section 1471(a)-(b); that is,
the district court retains original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all cases under title 11, and orginal but not exclusive jurisdiction
over proceedings either arising under title 11 or arising in or
related to a case under title 11.41 Section 1334(c) further provides
for two types of abstention by the district court; one is discre-
tionary, the other, mandatory. 44
"' See COLLIER, supra note 8, 3.01 [l][al[v] at 3-15. The purpose of the Emergency
Rule was "to avoid the collapse of the bankruptcy system." Id.
11 See Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). Section 122 provided that the
Amendments were to be effective as of the enactment date, except for 28 U.S.C. §
1334(c)(2), the mandatory abstention provision, and 28 U.S.C. § 1411(a), the right to
jury provision, which were not to apply to pending cases.
See BKR.-L.ED., Summary § 1:13 (1985).
Appellate jurisdiction, beyond the scope of this Note, is governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 158 for appeals from bankruptcy court orders and 28 U.S.C. § 1291-92 for appeals
from district court orders.
42 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1985).
" See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (1985) reads as follows:
(1) Nothing in this section prevents a district court in the interest of
justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State
law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under
title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.
(2) Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon
a State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under
title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title
11 with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in
a court of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the
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Second, section 157 establishes the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy courts. 45 It should be noted that section 157 speaks of
"bankruptcy judges" rather than "bankruptcy courts." The
reason for this is unclear, but it may be based on the language
found in section 151,6 which states that bankruptcy judges
constitute a "unit of the district court to be known as the
bankruptcy court, " 47 clarifying that bankruptcy courts are to be
considered district court divisions and not separate courts in
their own right.
48
Section 157(a) provides for the referral of "any or all cases
under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11
or arising in or related to a case under title 11 to the bankruptcy
judges. ' 49 This referral is authorized, but is not automatic as it
was under the 1978 Code. Congress hoped to address the con-
stitutional question of control by giving the district judges re-
ferral discretion.50 All districts have adopted by general rule such
a policy.5'
district court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action
is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of ap-
propriate jurisdiction. Any decision to abstain made under this subsec-
tion is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise. This subsection shall not
be construed to limit the applicability of the stay provided for by sec-
tion 362 of title 11, United States Code, as such section applies to an
action affecting the property of the estate in bankruptcy.
See notes 180-201 infra and accompanying text for a further discussion of § 1334(c).
28 U.S.C. § 157 (1985).
28 U.S.C. § 151 (1985) provides:
In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular active service
shall constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy
court for that district. Each bankruptcy judge, as a judicial officer of the
district court, may exercise the authority conferred under this chapter....
47 Id.
11 See CoLLm, supra note 8, 3.01[2][a] at 3-24. See also In re Northwest Cinema
Corp., 49 B.R. 479 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) stating:
[Tihere really is no bankruptcy court except in name. The term "bank-
ruptcy court" is solely a phrase that is applied to the bankruptcy judges
for a district insofar as those judges together are a unit of the district
court.. .Thus while functionally there may appear to be a separate bank-
ruptcy court, for jurisdictional purposes there is only one court, i.e., the
district court.
Id. at 1094.
28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1985).
See COLLIER, supra note 8, 3.0112][a] at 3-23 to 3-24 (one of the provisions
Congress enacted to avoid constitutional infirmities).
11 See Kamp, supra note 4, at 208 ("To my knowledge, all districts have promul-
gated a general order referring all bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy judges.").
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Section 157(b) further explains the adjudicatory authority of
the bankruptcy judges. Section 157(b)(1) gives bankruptcy judges
complete power to hear and finally determine 2 "all cases under
title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising
in a case under title 11."" Core proceedings are "defined" in
section 157(b)(2) by a list of fifteen matters that exemplify core
proceedings, including issues concerning preferences, fraudulent
conveyances, and the automatic stay. Although the list is exten-
sive, core proceedings are not limited to these fifteen examples.1
4
11 At least one court has questioned the meaning of "hear and determine":
It is unclear to me what it means to hear and determine a bankruptcy case.
Obviously the drafters of this section did not understand that a bankruptcy
case is not really a judicial proceeding at all, but rather an administrative
backdrop within which various, sundry and sometimes numerous proceed-
ings arise.
49 B.R. at 480 n.4.
3 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1985).
14 28 U.S.C. § 157(bX2) provides:
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions
from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interest for the
purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11 or 13 of title 11 but not
the liquidated or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury
tort or wrongful death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution
in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the
estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(No orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of
cash collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting
from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed
claims against the estate; and
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assests of the estate
or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder
relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
Id. See In re Baldwin-United Corp., 48 B.R. 49, 53 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) ("Congress
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The bankruptcy judge is given the authority to determine
whether a proceeding is core or non-core in section 157(b)(3),
which warns that this decision is not to be based solely on the
fact that the resolution of the proceeding may involve issues of
state law. 5 The statute rejects the view that a bankruptcy court
is constitutionally disabled from hearing claims grounded in state
law.
If the bankruptcy judge finds that a proceeding is non-core,
section 157(c)(1) provides that he may nevertheless hear the
proceeding if it is "otherwise related" to a case under title 11.
However, it is the district judge who must enter any final orders,
after reviewing the bankruptcy judge's findings and after a de
novo review of matters to which specific objections have been
made. 6 This provision was also responsive to Northern Pipe-
line's holding that the Article I bankruptcy courts were imper-
missibly exercising Article III power.5
7
Furthermore, if both parties consent, non-core, related pro-
ceedings may be heard and decided by a bankruptcy judge as
provided for in section 157(c)(2). 58 One issue that arises under
this provision is how a party effectively consents to Bankruptcy
Court jurisdiction.
intended that list to be representative, not all-inclusive."). See also notes 81-153 infra
and accompanying text for a further discussion of § 157(b)(2).
5 28 U.S.C. § 157(bX3) provides:
The bankruptcy judge shall determine, on the judge's own motion or on
timely motion of party, whether a proceeding is a core proceeding under
this subsection or is a proceeding that is otherwise related to a case under
title 11. A determination that a proceeding is not a core proceeding shall
not be made solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected by State
law.
Id.
"28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) reads in full:
A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding
but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding,
the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall be
entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's
proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those
matters to which any party has timely and specifically objected.
Id.
, See CoLim , supra note 8, 3.01[2][d][i] at 3-35 to 3-37. See notes 19-24 supra
and accompanying text for a discussion of Northern Pipeline.
19 28 U.S.C. § 157(cX2) provides:
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In Baldwin-United Corp.,9 the bankruptcy judge held that
the defendant had consented to jurisdiction, explaining:
The doctrine of consent which prevailed under the 1898 Act
has been codified by Congress in Section 157(c)(2). It may be
fairly assumed that Congress intended that consent to the
Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction could be manifested in the
same fashion as under the 1898 Act. Thus consent under
Section 157(c)(2) may be express; it may be implied from a
timely failure to object to the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction;
or it may be implied from any act which indicates a willingness
to have the Bankruptcy Court determine a claim or interest.6
Thus, regardless of whether the defendant's counterclaims against
the debtor were classified as "core" or "non-core" proceedings,
he was deemed to have consented because he filed such coun-
terclaims seeking affirmative relief from the court, and because
he filed proofs of claim.6'
While section 157(a) provides for a general discretionary
referral of all cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy judge,
62
section 157(d) provides for the withdrawal of such referral. 63
The district court may withdraw "for cause shown." This per-
Notwithstanding the provisions of 1 (I) of this subsection, the district
court, with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding, may refer a
proceeding related to a case under title 11 to a bankruptcy judge to hear
and determine and to enter appropriate orders and judgments subject to
review under section 158 of this title.
Id.
59 48 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
0 Id. at 54. On the other hand, COLLIER suggests that consent should not be so
broad as to include consent implied from a failure to object to jurisdiction. See COLL.uR,
supra note 8, 3.01[2][d[ii] at 3-39.
6, 48 B.R. at 54-55.
62 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
-1 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) provides:
The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part, any case or proceed-
ing referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely motion of
any party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on timely motion of
a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court determines that resolution
of the proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of
the United States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate
commerce.
[Vol. 75
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missive withdrawal may be upon the court's own motion or the
timely motion of any party. The district court shall withdraw
"if the court determines that resolution of the proceeding re-
quires consideration of both title 11 and other laws of the United
States regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate
commerce." This mandatory withdrawal is only available upon
the timely motion of any party.64
Sections 1334 and 157 represent the very heart of the present
jurisdictional system. 65 Unfortunately, neither is a model of clar-
ity. For example, what do "arising in," "arising under," and
"related to" mean? What is the distinction between core and
non-core proceedings? Congress did not define any of these key
terms, but rather left the system shrouded in ambiguity, perhaps
in an attempt to create a resulting constitutional scheme. 66 The
courts are only now beginning to carve out some meaning for
these provisions and terms.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF TE 1984 AMENDMENTS
A. Arising Under, Arising In, and Related To
The importance in differentiating among these terms becomes
apparent upon reading the abstention provisions in section 1334
and the core determination in section 157(b)(2), each of which
turns on how a proceeding is classified. 67 Several attempts have
been made to define these terms.
In re American Energy, Inc.6s involved an adversary action
by the trustee to collect monies allegedly due the debtor under
- See id. See notes 154-179 infra and accompanying text for a more detailed
discussion of withdrawal.
11 See, e.g., BKR.-L.ED., Summary § 2:14.3 (Supp. 1985) ("Central to the congres-
sional effort to enact a constitutionally valid but non-Article III bankruptcy court
structure is the concept of 'core proceedings'.").
16 "[D]ebate still attends the matter of the extent to which the jurisdictional
structure provided by the 1984 Act. . . accommodates the decision of the Supreme Court
in Northern Pipeline. . . ." Id. at § 1:14. See also 130 CONG. REC. H7490 (daily ed. June
29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (jurisdictional powers granted bankruptcy judge
not free from constitutional doubt); note 5 supra.
' See COLLIER, supra note 8, 3.01[1][b][ii] at 3-22.
14 50 B.R. 175 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).
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several supply contracts.6 9 The bankruptcy court divided its grant
of jurisdiction into four categories and defined each. First, "cases
under title 11" means "the original bankruptcy petition itself
from which all other bankruptcy proceedings spring."' 70 Second,
"civil proceedings arising under title 11" means "the type of
proceeding typically associated with bankruptcy adjudica-
tion. . .which spring from the operation and application of the
Bankruptcy Code itself. " 71 Third, "civil proceedings arising in
cases under title 11" refers to "the type of claim or proceeding
that secondarily springs from a pending case which arose under
Title 11. " 72 Finally, "civil proceedings related to cases under
Title 11" means "those proceedings which do not arise under
Title 11 or in a case under Title 11 but are nonetheless 'related'
to cases under Title 11."173
This court's analysis is not very helpful because although it
states the "magic word" standards that the court is following,
it provides no examples to give these standards meaning. There-
fore, the only clear statement from this case is that the adversary
proceeding involved fell outside the four categories and resulted
in the court's abstention.7 4
The court in In re S.E. Hornsby & Sons Sand and Gravel
Company75 followed a similar analysis,76 but defined the terms
a bit differently, relying heavily on Collier's explanations. The
court defined "case" as "the case upon which all of the pro-
ceedings which follow the filing of the petition are predicated." '
Thus, when the bankruptcy petition is filed, voluntarily or in-
voluntarily, the "case" is opened. In defining "arising under"
the court also turned to Collier:. "[W]here a cause of action is
one that either is one [sic] created by Title 11 or which is
concerned with what formerly were called 'administrative' mat-
See id. at 177.





71 45 B.R. 988 (Bankr. M. D. La. 1985).
76 See id. at 994-95 (The court used the same four categories as did the American
Energy court.).
7 Id. at 994 (quoting COLLIER, supra note 8, at J 3.01).
[Vol. 75
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ters in the sense that no adverse third party was involved...
then that civil proceeding is one 'arising under Title 11.' "78
Fuithermore, the court stated that those proceedings "arising
under" are those that would not arise but for the Bankruptcy
Code, giving as examples (1) claims of exemption under the
bankruptcy statute, (2) claims of discrimination against a debtor
on account of filing bankruptcy, and (3) avoiding powers of the
trustee.7 9 The court held that the adversary proceeding brought
by the trustee to require the debtor's shareholders to turn over
the debtor's assets was a proceeding that arises under Title 11.10
As noted above, these are important terms in the 1984
Amendments and the distinction among them is the key for
arriving at a correct application of the abstention provisions and
the core/non-core dichotomy. It is regrettable that Congress left
it to the courts to define these terms, resulting in a myriad of
definitions, rather than formulating one definition for all courts
to apply uniformly.
B. The Core/Non-Core Dichotomy
Section 157(b) gives bankruptcy judges authority to hear,
determine, and issue judgments in all cases under title 11, and
all core proceedings either arising under title 11 or arising in a
case under title 11.11 When comparing Sections 157(b) and 157(c),
the importance of distinguishing between core and non-core
proceedings is evident.8 2 If the proceeding is not core, but is
otherwise related to a title 11 case, the bankruptcy judge may
not issue the final judgment, but only a proposed finding.83
Therefore, the courts have been wrestling with this distinction
since the Amendments were passed.84
Id. at 994-95 (quoting COLLIER, supra note, 8 at 3.01).
See id. at 995.
'o See id. at 998.
" See notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text.
"2 "The distinction in the bankruptcy courts' role in core versus non-core proceed-
ings is the essence of the jurisdictional system designed by Congress in the wake of...
Northern Pipeline ... ." In re Lion Capital Group, 46 B.R. 850, 852 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985) (citation omitted).
See notes 53, 56 supra and accompanying text.
'" See, e.g., In re Illinois-California Exp., Inc., 50 B.R. 232, 235-36 (Bankr. D.
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Core proceedings have been grouped into four general cate-
gories: 5 (1) matters of administration, (2) avoiding actions,
8 7
(3) matters concerning property of the estate 8 and (4) others.89
Several types of proceedings are easily decided and produce little
controversy90 Other proceedings are more difficult and lie at the
heart of Congressional concern over jurisdiction.
One of the easier issues involves proceedings to adjust the
automatic stay. In In re Lion Capital Group,9' the trustee brought
an adversary proceeding against the limited partners of the debtor
Colo. 1985) ("[Ain analysis of ... cases [discussing bankruptcy court jurisdiction]
reflects the current uncertainty surrounding the parameters of the Bankruptcy Court's
jurisdiction.").
' See COLLIER, supra note 8, 3.01[2][b][iii] at 3-28 to 3-30.
This category includes 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(A), (B), (D), (G), (I), (J), and
(L). See note 54 supra for the text of these subsections.
This category includes 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(2)(F) and (H). See note 54 supra for
the text of these subsections.
This category includes 28 U.S.C §§ 157 (b)(2)(E), (K), (M), and (N). See note
54 supra for the text of these subsections.
89 This category includes 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(B)(2)(C) and (0). See note 54 supra
for the text of these subsections.
10 See In re L. A. Clarke and Son, Inc., 51 B.R. 31, 33 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985)
(adversary proceeding to recover post-petition account receivable falls under either §
157(b)(2)(A) or (B) as core); In re Republic Oil Corp., 51 B.R. 355, 358 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1985) (action to assume or reject executory contracts is "matter concerning the
administration of the estate" and core); In re Heaven Sent, Ltd., 50 B.R. 636, 638
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (proceeding by Chapter I 1 debtor to preserve insurance policy is
directly related to administration of estate under § 157(b)(2)(A)); In re Pied Piper
Casuals, Inc., 50 B.R. 549, 550-51 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (proceeding to recover
insurance proceeds allegedly due debtor is core, either under § 157(b)(2)(E), or under
"significant nexus" of proceeding to bankruptcy considerations); In re Criswell, 44 B.R.
95, 97 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (claim against debtor for punitive damages is "claim
against the estate" and core). Compare the following cases that find a proceeding is
non-core: In re Omega Equip. Corp., 51 B.R. 569, 574 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985) (civil
contempt proceeding not core as it "entails a wholly collateral factual inquiry"); In re
Cannon, 51 B.R. 349, 350-51 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985) (proceeding against non-creditor
for alleged violations of state contract law and federal Truth-in-Lending Act does not
become core merely because any recovery would go into bankruptcy estate); In re Pan
American School of Travel, Inc., 47 B.R. 242, 244 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (action seeking
injunction against Chapter 11 debtor whose plan has been confirmed "bears no relation
to the administration of the bankruptcy estate or to any of the other categories of core
proceedings," nor has any other "nexus" to the bankruptcy); In re Pierce, 44 B.R. 601,
602 (D. Colo. 1984) (" 'core proceedings' do not encompass separate state law contract
actions"); In re Atlas Automation, Inc., 42 B.R. 246, 247 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984)
(although perimeters of §§ 157(b)(2)(E) and (0) are still undefined, they do not include
action to recover account receivable, a purely contract law action).
91 46 B.R. 850 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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upon an alleged contractual obligation to make capital contri-
butions. 92 The bankruptcy court granted the trustee's motion to
stay defendants from bringing suit in district court and dismissed
certain counterclaims brought by the defendants. 93 The defend-
ants alleged that these proceedings were not core and thus the
bankruptcy judge lacked authority to make a final determina-
tion. 94
The court held that the trustee's motion seeking a stay was
"undoubtedly a core proceeding," falling under "matters con-
cerning administration of the estate," since it was "grounded
on the harm to efficient administration of the debtor's estate
that would likely occur absent a stay."' 95 Also, the court found
that the adversary proceeding itself fell within the meaning of
"core" under either subsection (0), as a proceeding affecting
the adjustment of the debtor-equity security holder relationship,
or subsection (E), as a turnover proceeding.9
In re HBG Servicenter, Inc.97 dealt with an adversary pro-
ceeding filed by debtors seeking to enjoin the state attorney
general from continuing to prosecute them for sales tax viola-
tions. 98 The bankruptcy court found the matter to be a "core
proceeding," subject to final resolution, for one of two rea-
sons. 99 First, it could be considered core under subsection (G),
"motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay."
Although the debtors were not literally seeking to modify the
automatic stay, the court found their action could be the equiv-
alent, since the stay asked for was different from and broader
than the automatic stay.1 0° Alternatively, the court found the
proceeding to be sufficiently similar to subsection (G) to have
the "character" of a core proceeding:
See id. at 856.
See id. at 852.
See id.
Id. at 854-55.
' See id. at 855-56.
45 B.R. 668 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985).
See id. at 668-69.
See id. at 671.
,o See id. Since continuation of criminal proceedings against the debtor are ex-
empted from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1), the debtors were asking
that the court expand the stay using its power under 11 U.S.C. § 105.
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The specific enumeration of what are core proceedings in 28
U.S.C. Section 157(b)(2) is explicitly stated not to be exclusive.
Evidently what was intended to be embraced were the tradi-
tional areas of bankruptcy jurisdiction. An application for
injunctive relief to protect this Court's jurisdiction is of this
traditional character.'0'
Thus under this interpretation, the most obvious core proceed-
ings may be read expansively, resulting in the not-so-obvious
proceedings also receiving core treatment.
Another example of this approach to interpreting "core" is
In re Harry C. Partridge, Jr. & Sons, Inc. 0 2 The debtor, a
subcontractor, brought suit against its general contractor, seek-
ing a reduction in the percentage of payment withheld pending
completion of the subcontract.101 The district court stated that
although the debtor's complaint was styled as a breach of con-
tract and breach of fiduciary duty, in reality the debtor was
seeking a turnover of the percentage differential that the debtor
contended was wrongfully withheld.'°4 Thus, this proceeding was
expressly defined as core under section 157(b)(2)(E), "orders to
turn over property of the estate."'' 0 Note that this court was
willing to read allegations into the debtor's complaint that were
not actually charged in order to reach the obvious core classifi-
cation.
On the other hand, one court has taken a seemingly obvious
core proceeding and inserted a limitation upon its application
that took it outside the core meaning. In re Dr. C. Huff Co. 116
involved a lien priority dispute between two creditors. 0 7 The
court noted that this proceeding arguably could fall under section
157(b)(2)(K), "determinations of the validity, extent, or priority
of liens," and thus be core. 06 However, the court added a
30 45 B.R. at 671.
0 48 B.R. 1006 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
1O Id. at 1006-07.
304 Id. at 1010.
,o, Id. ("[T]he essence of this action implicates a turnover proceeding which is
expressly defined as a core proceeding."). See also 50 B.R. 549 for an intrepretation of
§ 157(b)(2)(E) (trustee's action to recover insurance proceeds allegedly due debtor under
policy was core).
0 44 B.R. 129 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984).
101 Id. at 130.
Im Id. at 134.
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further requirement that subsection (K) only applies when deal-
ing with "determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of
liens upon the property of the estate."109 As this proceeding was
a private lien dispute between two creditors that did not affect
the debtor or his property, the court held this to be non-core."10
This analysis results in some question as to the "easy issues"
determination, and further demonstrates how courts are willing
to rework the literal wording of the statute to reach the desired
result.
Although many of the examples of core proceedings listed
in section 157(b)(2) are straightforward, two are especially open
to interpretation and controversy."' These fall within the fourth
category of "others,""12 and include subsection (C), "counter-
claims by the estate against persons filing claims against the
estate" and subsection (0), "other proceedings affecting the
liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the
debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship. . .. ""'
In In re Lombard-Wall, Inc.," 4 the court interpreted section
157(b)(2)(C). A chapter 11 debtor, in response to a proof of
claim filed by a creditor, challenged two withdrawals made by
the creditor, a government agency, on letters of credit provided
by the debtor as guarantees on a purchase of securities." 5 The
court found this to be a core proceeding under subsection (C)
and explained:
'- Id. (emphasis added).
" Id. at 135. The court went on to hold this proceeding to be unrelated because
the decision would have "no effect whatsoever on any aspect of the debtor's bankruptcy
proceeding." Id. See also In re McKinney, 45 B.R. 790, 791-92 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985)
(same court reached same conclusion).
"' See COLLIER, supra note 8, at 3.01[2][b][iii] at 3-30 to 3-33. Collier suggests
that subsection (C) will again open issues that existed under the Code as to when a party
consents to jurisdiction. Subsection (C) provides that by filing a proof of claim, a party
consents to jurisdiction. The question may arise as to other types of analogous conduct
that may result in consent. For a further discussion of this issue, see notes 58-60 supra
and accompanying text.
The interpretational problem under subsection (0) is how broadly courts are to
interpret its reach; see notes 106-12, 151-153 infra and accompanying text.
112 See text accompanying note 89 supra for the four categories of core proceedings
and note 54 supra for the text of § 157(b)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
48 B.R. 986 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Id. at 988-89.
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Although this language [in subsection (C)] would appear to
extend the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to all counterclaims,
courts have traditionally permitted bankruptcy courts to assert
jurisdiction over counterclaims by a trustee only when there
exists some connection between the claims of the creditor and
those of the trustee."
6
Thus, this court put some limitation upon the meaning of sub-
section (C) in that there must be "some connection" between
the claims.
The court in the Lion Capital case" 7 not only decided several
easy issues," 8 but also dealt with the defendants' assertion that
their fraud-based counterclaims and defenses inserted a state-law
complexity into the proceeding which Northern Pipeline prohib-
ited and thus made it non-core." 9 In holding the proceeding to
be core, however, the court's reasoning was threefold: (1) claims
and counterclaims against the estate fall under section 157(b)(2)(B)
as core; (2) the counterclaims would have to be ranked in the
bankruptcy proceeding itself and thus presented specialized
bankruptcy issues; and (3) defendants' other defenses concerning
the trustee's authority to bring this suit should be handled by
the bankruptcy judge120 Thus, both Lombard-Wall and Lion
Capital indicate that all counterclaims, either by the estate or by
third parties, stand a good chance of being classified as "core."
In contrast to the Lombard-Wall decision, 2 ' requiring "some
connection" between the claims of the estate and creditor, the
court in In re Marketing Resources Intern. Corp. '2 held that
because the creditor filed a proof of claim, the proceeding was
core and the court had jurisdiction to address all claims brought
by the debtor.'2 The fear that a "jurisdictional ambush" might
occur under subsection (C) is clearly realized in this case. 24
16 Id. at 990-91 (citation omitted).
11 See notes 91-94 supra and accompanying text.
118 See notes 95-96 supra and accompanying text.
"9 46 B.R. at 860.
1 Id. at 860-61.
,21 See notes 114-116 supra and accompanying text.
2 43 B.R. 71 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
13Id.
,2, See BKR.-L.ED., Summary § 2:14.3 (Supp. 1984) which states:
The Marketing Resources case illustrates the possibility of how the 1984
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In contrast to the broad interpretation of subsection (C),
subsection (0) is generally being read narrowly by the courts.
In Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Robinson Industries, Inc.,'12 the
debtor argued that a suit for alleged breach. of express and
implied warranties fell under section 157(b)(2)(O).' 26 The court
noted that while such claims might arguably affect the liquida-
tion of the estate's assets (that is, if the debtor prevailed, more
assets would go into the estate for distribution to the debtor's
creditors) such a reading of subsection (0) "would be unconsti-
tutional because it would result in an Article I court finally
adjudicating rights that are traditionally cognizable in Article III
courts."'
1 2 7
In re Morse Electric Co. also interpreted subsection (0).' 28
The debtor brought an adversary proceeding alleging breach of
contract, bad faith and negligence. 29 The court stated: "Subsec-
tion 0 is a comprehensive residual category, the one in which
the distinction between core and related proceedings is least
clear. The breadth or narrowness with which this subsection is
interpreted will be determined in future court decisions."' 30 The
court held this action was clearly non-core as a "prebankruptcy
state common-law action related only peripherally to the bank-
ruptcy itself."' 3 '
Once the bankruptcy judge determines that a proceeding is
non-core, he or she must still determine whether it is "related
Act may lead to jurisdiction by ambush .... [i.e.,] by merely filing a proof
of claim against the estate, a creditor may subject itself to counterclaims
and to the general jurisdiction of the court.
See also Hendel & Reinhardt, Evolution of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction after the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 90 CoM. L.J. 272, 276
(June/July 1984) ("It remains to be seen whether [the Baldwin-United, Lombard-Wall,
and Marketing Resources] decisions represent a major new current in jurisdictional
thinking or are merely a small wave on a troubled sea."); notes 58-60 supra and
accompanying text.
111 46 B.R. 464 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
Id. at 465.
'Id. at 465-66.
47 B.R. 234 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985).
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236.
' Id. at 237. Indeed, the court stated, this suit was almost identical to the Northern
Pipeline decision.
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to" a title 11 case before it can be heard under section 157(c)(1). 32
Several cases have attempted to define "related to."
In Matter of Boughton, 33 the court defined related proceed-
ings as: "[those] adversary cases and controversies which are
triable only by Article III or State courts.... [They] are tra-
ditional state common-law actions not made subject to a federal
rule of decision and related only peripherally to an adjudication
of bankruptcy under federal law .... ,,134 The court found that
the proceeding by the trustee to recover damages from the debt-
or's insurer because of negligent and willful failure to accept a
settlement offer fell within the meaning of "related," as a cause
of action owned by the debtor at the time he filed for relief. 3 5
Further, the court cited with approval the Pacor rule an-
nounced under former section 1471 interpreting the same lan-
guage used in the 1984 Amendments.136 Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 37
involved a products liability claim against the debtor, an asbestos
supplier. The district court remanded the case back to state
court, holding a lack of jurisdiction. 38 The court of appeals
affirmed, defining a related proceeding as one which "could
alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action
(either positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts
on the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate."' 39
132 Several bankruptcy judges seem to equate non-core and related as having the
same meaning. See, e.g., Matter of Boughton, 49 B.R. 312, 314 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1985)
(non-core are those matters which are related to); In re Morse EIec. Co., 47 B.R. 234,
238 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985) (proceeding cannot be core; accordingly, it is related).
Thus, under this analysis, once a proceeding is held not to be core, it becomes non-core
and related to, and may be heard under § 157 (c)(1).
However, this author agrees with a different analysis, as set forth by the Huff
court, 44 B.R. at 134. The court explained that there are three types of controversies
that may arise: core, non-core related, and non-core unrelated. See also 47 B.R. at 245
(not only is suit not core, it also is not related). This analysis results in a 2-prong test
rather than one step only.
131 49 B.R. 312 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985).
114 Id. at 315 (quoting from Matter of Colo. Energy Supply, Inc., 728 F.2d 1283,
1285 (10th Cir. 1984)).
W Id. at 315.
136 Id.
-1, 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984).
I Id. at 985.
139 Id. at 994.
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The case of In re American Energy, Inc.140 also attempts to
define "related proceedings":
[The cause of action must in some way relate to the admin-
istration of the bankrupt estate. That is to say, there must be
some reason why adjudication of the claim is better placed
with the bankruptcy court as opposed to a state court. Giving
a very broad definition to the term would transform every
state-created cause of action into a federal matter merely be-
cause a debtor were involved, but this would be a jurisdiction-
ally infirm construction. Courts construing the term "related"
have said that it means that there must exist a direct relation-
ship to the administration of the bankrupt estate.41
The court held that the trustee's action to collect money allegedly
due the debtor under a contract was only "incidentally related"
to the bankruptcy proceeding, since it was based solely on state
law, and that the court thus lacked jurisdiction. 42 This case
indicates an interpretation that is keyed to the existence of a
state law issue, precisely what Congress sought to discourage in
section 157(b)(3). 43 The presence of a state law issue should not
automatically result in a lack of jurisdiction. 44
A final case on this issue is Weaver v. Gillen,'45 an action
by the debtor against the trustee for breach of fiduciary duty.'46
The court held this to be a related proceeding, and possibly a
core proceeding as well. 47 The court used a two-part analysis to
find a related proceeding. First, the proceeding must be one that
could have been brought in a district or state court absent the
1,* 50 B.R. 175 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985).
1'4 Id. at 179.
"I Id. at 180-81.
141 See note 55 supra for the text of § 157(b)(3), wherein Congress provided that
"[al determination that a proceeding is not a core proceeding shall not be made solely
on the basis that its resolution may be affected by State law."
- An overly restrictive interpretation of Northern Pipeline would result in bank-
ruptcy judges being incapable of hearing virtually any dispute arising during a bankruptcy
proceeding, since almost all issues touch state law to some extent. See CoLLRE, supra
note 8, at 3.01[2][c] at 3-34.
" 49 B.R. 70 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1985).
1,6 Id. at 71.
" Id. at 72. Because the case was decided by the district court, a core determination
was unnecessary to confer final adjudicatory authority upon the court.
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bankruptcy petition.148 Second, there must be a " 'significant
connection' to the bankruptcy case.' ' 49
Thus, while it appears that the bankruptcy courts are holding
both broadly and narrowly on what constitutes a core proceed-
ing, the trend seems to be favoring a core classification. 50
Perhaps the example listed in section 157(b)(2) with the great-
est potential for expanding jurisdiction is subsection (O).1 s' It is
still uncertain how far the courts will go in expanding its inter-
pretation. 5 2 However, as one court has put it, Northern Pipeline
must be reckoned with:
[The outer limits of what constitutes a core proceeding is left
to be defined by the courts [citation omitted]. Yet, any exercise
in interpreting the amendments must be done within the guide-
lines set forth by the Supreme Court, since the purpose of the
amendments was to rectify the unconstitutional jurisdiction
found in Marathon.'53
"4 Id. at 71. For the first prong, the court adopted the meaning of "related"
announced in the Emergency Rule. See notes 28-38 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Emergency Rule.
,49 Id. at 72. For the second prong, the court relied on In re Turner, 724 F.2d 338
(2d Cir. 1983), decided under the Emergency Rule. In Turner, the debtor had sued her
landlord for conversion. The bankruptcy judge, and district court on appeal, found in
favor of the debtor. The court of appeals reversed, stating that the lower courts had
given "related to" too broad a meaning; i.e., "no showing that [debtor's] action against
[landlord] had any 'significant connection' with her bankruptcy case." Id. at 341. See
also In re Herschell, 43 B.R. 680, 682 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984) (using the "significant
connection" test of Turner). The Herschell court noted that although Turner was decided
under the Emergency Rule, the 1984 Act requires the same result. Id. at 682 n.2.
I" See Hendel & Reinhardt, supra note 124, at 273-74, stating:
It appears that the developing trend of the reported decisions on the
question of what constitutes core proceedings is sufficiently liberal to allow
the observation that doubt as to status (core v. non-core) will probably
result in a classification of a matter as "core" in nature.
"' Id. at 274 (Subsection (0) is "[t]he one subsection which will have a major
influence on the determination of the scope of the bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction. . .
152 One court adopted a novel approach, stating:
A common sense interpretation of the term "core" would dictate that it
include only those proceedings which are specifically defined in subsection
(b)(2)(B) through (N) or in the Bankruptcy Code itself.
In re American Energy, Inc., 50 B.R. at 178.
"I In re Illinois-Cal. Exp., Inc., 50 B.R. 232, 236 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1985). See also
In re TWI, Inc., 51 B.R. 470, 470 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985), stating:
Rightly or wrongly, we turn to Marathon alone to reach an answer, to the
pure source. Yes, there is some existing case law, but it is not ripe. There
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C. Withdrawal of Reference
Section 157(d) gives the district court discretion to withdraw
any reference "for cause shown," but makes withdrawal man-
datory in those proceedings that require consideration of title 11
and other federal laws regulating interstate commerce.154 While
the legislative history behind the mandatory withdrawal provi-
sion indicates a narrow construction, it gives little insight into
the policy consideration underlying such withdrawal. 5 s The man-
date is most likely a Congressional decision that a bankruptcy
judge should not hear and determine proceedings involving fed-
eral law issues, for example, those arising in antitrust and se-
curities law cases. 56 Bankruptcy judges are very specialized and
Congress believed that the district courts would be more skilled
in deciding these issues, which often arise in the district courts. 57
One issue under section 157(d) is what may be considered
sufficient "cause" for permissive withdrawal. 5 8 In In re Edward
Pirsig Farms, Inc., 59 the court held that a party's contention
that the bankruptcy court might be required to consider the
constitutionality of a provision of the Code was insufficient
cause for withdrawal.16 The court in United States v. LeBouf
Bros. Towing Co.' 61 also found insufficient cause for withdrawal
where the alleged cause was a conflict in jurisdiction between
the district court and the bankruptcy court over several of the
debtor's ships that were subject to a mortgage foreclosure ac-
tion. 62 The court pointed out that no such conflict could ever
is something there that rings untrue. Let us avoid the moons and go to
the sun.
All parts of the riddle must be held up in the light of Marathon.
" See note 63 supra for text of § 157(d).
'" See COLLIER, supra note 8, at 3.01[2][e] at 3-41.
"~Id.
'" See id. at 3-41 to 3-42. COLLIER suggests that section 157(d) was passed for two
reasons: "to insulate the 1984 legislation against successful contitutional attack, and to
single out a special type of adversary proceeding for separate treatment." Id. at 3.01
[21[e] at 3-40.
" See id. at 3-40 stating: "What might constitute cause for withdrawal of the
reference is unclear, and will have to await judicial development."
"1 47 B.R. 376 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
Id. at 378.
45 B.R. 887 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1985).
Id. at 891.
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exist because it assumes two separate jurisdictional authorities
and the bankruptcy court is merely a unit of the district court. 63
In re Lion Capital Group further explains the meaning of
permissive withdrawal.'64 In an adversary proceeding brought by
the trustee to recover monies allegedly due the debtor from its
investors, the defendant argued that the trustee's claims against
him were non-core. The district court, therefore, would have to
make the final order and withdrawal now by the bankruptcy
judge would avoid duplication in two separate reviews, one by
the bankruptcy judge and one by the district court. 65 The court
stated that the "mere availability" of a de novo review by the
district court was not sufficient cause to withdraw.' 66 If it were,
it would result in automatic withdrawal of any case in which a
non-core claim was in any way involved. 67 Further, the court
relied on the general legislative history of section 157 which
read:
[B]ankruptcy judges'would be able to enter final judgments in
about 95 percent of the cases that do not require an involve-
ment by an article three judge. In the remaining five percent
of bankruptcy cases, the bankruptcy judge would enter a pro-
posed judgment and the district court, after reviewing the
record but without holding a second hearing, could promptly
enter a final judgment.'"
If the court held this to be sufficient cause for withdrawal, the
result would be avoidance of many proceedings by the bank-
ruptcy courts, which obviously was not Congress' intent.
Another issue arising under section 157(d) is the interpreta-
tion of the mandatory withdrawal provision. 69 In re White Mo-
tor Corp. 70 involved a claim by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
163 Id.
48 B.R. 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
"I Id. at 336.
' Id.
167 Id.
16 Id. (quoting 130 CONG. REC. H1846 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (statement of
Rep. Kastenmeier)).
'69 See COLLIER, supra note 8, at 3.01 12][e] at 3-41 ("The second sentence of
section 157(d) will assuredly be the cause of much litigation and interpretation."). See
also note 63 supra for text of § 157(d).
"7 42 B.R. 693 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
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Corporation, a federal government entity, against the debtor for
withdrawal of reference.' 7' The court relied heavily on legislative
history 72 to reach its conclusion that withdrawal is mandated
only when a "substantial and material consideration" of the
non-Code federal statutes will be required. 7 3 Further, withdrawal
is not required when mere consideration of such statutes is
involved; rather, the statutes must be necessary for the resolution
of the proceeding. 7 4 The court held that withdrawal was not
warranted based upon speculation that the Internal Revenue
Code and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act might
arise and might be germane to the proceeding. 7- Also, the court
pointed out that section 157(d) is not limited to "related pro-
ceedings," but applies to "core proceedings" as well.
76
In re Lion Capital Group'n also discussed the limits of
mandatory withdrawal, relying on the legislative history to sup-
"' Id. at 694.
'7, See id. at 699-700. For example, Sen. DeConcini stated:
The district court should withdraw such proceedings only if the court
determines that the assertion that other laws regulating organizations or
activities affecting interstate commerce are in fact likely to be considered,
and should not allow a party to use this provision to require withdrawal
where such laws are not material to resolution of the proceeding. The
district court should refuse withdrawal if withdrawal would unduly delay
administration of the case, considering the status of the case, the impor-
tance of the proceeding to the case, and the relative caseloads of the district
court and bankruptcy judge.
(quoting from 130 CoNG. Rac. S6081 (daily ed. June 19, 1984)).
,1- 42 B.R. at 705.
174 Id. at 703. The court noted:
For this Court to grant the motion to withdraw reference based on spec-
ulation about ERISA and IRC issues which may or may not arise and may
or may not be germane to resolution of core Code proceedings would be
inconsistent with the purposes underlying the very existence of the Bank-
ruptcy Court and would encourage forum shopping in a manner Congress
disdained when it sought to avoid "creating a multiplicity of forums for
the adjudication of part of a bankruptcy case."
Id. at 705 (quoting 130 CoNo. REc. H7492 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier)).
M 42 B.R. at 704-06.
576 Id. at 701. See also Michigan Milk Producers Ass'n v. Hunter, 46 B.R. 214
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (same court again applying a narrow interpretation of § 157(d));
COULER, supra note 8, at 3.01[2][e] at 3-41 (mandatory withdrawal encompasses core
and non-core proceedings).
" 48 B.R. 329 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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port the view that section 157(d) should be construed narrowly. 7 8
The court relied on White Motor's "substantial and material
consideration" test to find that withdrawal was warranted in the
adversary proceeding to recover money from a debtor's investors
because none of the pleadings as yet involved federal laws-
although the defendants argued that their amended pleadings
would involve federal securities.
79
While section 157(d) was obviously a precautionary measure
by Congress to comply with Northern Pipeline, the above cases
show that the courts are construing the provision narrowly.
D. Abstention by the District Court
Section 1334(c)(1) provides for discretionary abstention in
any proceeding arising under title 11, or arising in or related to
a case under title 11,180 if "in the interest of justice, or in the
interest of comity with State courts or respect for State laws."' 8'
In most cases, the abstention decision is being made by the
bankruptcy judge, 8 2 but at least one case has held that only the
district court has such authority. 83 The main issue arising under
this provision is how broadly or narrowly the courts interpret
the interest of justice and comity.' 84
78 Id. at 340 (quoting same legislative statements as did the White Motor court).
"9 Id. at 340-41.
110 Discretionary abstention applies to core as well as non-core proceedings, as
compared to mandatory abstention, which applies only to related proceedings. Neither
abstention provision applies to cases, which are governed under 11 U.S.C. § 305. See
COLLIR, supra note 8, at 3.01 [3][a] at 3-44.
, See note 44 supra for text of § 1334(c).
282 See, e.g., In re Pioneer Corp., 47 B.R. 624, 627-28 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1985) (bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to decide on motion to abstain, pursuant to §
157 and 1984 Act as a whole). Most courts just decide the motion without questioning
their jurisdictional authority to do so.
"I See In re Atlas Automation, Inc., 42 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1984) (neither 1334(c) nor any other provision gives authority to bankruptcy judge to
decide motion to abstain, so only district court may make such decision).
I" See, e.g., In re Douthit, 47 B.R. 428, 431 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1985) (bankruptcy
court not most appropriate forum to consider judgment creditor's claim for punitive
and compensatory damages, attorney fees and costs); In re Schear & Assoc. Inc., 47
B.R. 544, 545 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (abstain from adversary proceeding to recover
accounts receivable where district court could not hear expeditiously a related proceed-
ing); Maryland Nat'l Indus. Fin. v. Gold Dust Coal Co. 49 B.R. 288, 291-92 (Bankr.
N.D. Il. 1985) (abstain from dispute between two creditors over assets of debtor's
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In Matter of Boughton, the court stated: "Comity and justice
would dictate that this court abstain if the matter before it
involves issues of State constitutional law, important State pol-
icy, or unsetfled State law."'' 85 Because the good faith duty of
an insurer to settle within policy limits was well-settled by state
law, the court found no reason to abstain from the trustee's
adversary proceeding to recover monies from the debtor's in-
surer.
8 6
Furthermore, the court pointed out that some bankruptcy
courts consider whether the outcome of the proceeding in ques-
tion will have any effect on the estate-if so, the court should
not abstain.8 7 The court declined to abstain since this was a no-
asset estate and the outcome of the proceeding would determine
whether the creditors would receive anything at all.88
The court in In re S.E. Hornsby & Sons Sand and Gravel
Co. 89 also refused to abstain from hearing a proceeding brought
by the trustee to recover monies allegedly due the debtor, but
for slightly different reasons. Since the proceeding was to recover
property of the debtor and the district court exercises exclusive
control over such property,'90 the court found that abstention
would be inappropriate, especially because proceeding on the
subsidiary which was not bankrupt); In re Weldpower Indus. Inc., 49 B.R. 46, 48
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1985) (abstain from adversary proceeding concerning a pre-bankruptcy
transaction); In re Keyco, Inc., 49 B.R. 507, 509 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985) (abstain where
dispute does not involve debtors, there is a pending state court action, and dispute
involves issues of state law); In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 43 B.R. 616, 618 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1984) (abstain from proceeding to recover accounts receivable where party
contends § 157 is unconstitutional in order to avoid delay of United States intervention
and a decision on the constitutionality issue).
191 49 B.R. 312, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985).
6 Id. at 316.
10 Id. See, e.g., Ram Constr. Co. v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County 49 B.R. 363,
367 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985) (collection of debtor's assets is essential part of estate
administration and therefore inappropriate to abstain); In re Ghen, 45 B.R. 780, 782
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (Court should abstain from proceeding "where its subject matter
is identical to that of the pending state court suit, and its outcome would have no
bearing on the administration of the estate.").
49 B.R. at 316.
45 B.R. 988 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1985).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (1985), which provides:
The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property, wherever located,
of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of the estate.
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same matter had been languishing in state court for over a
year. 191
The court did abstain in In re Franklin Press, Inc., a pro-
ceeding by a Chapter 11 debtor to recover a post-petition account
receivable. 92 The court reasoned:
The defendant intends to assert a significant counterclaim. The
issues presented by both the debtor and the defendant involve
soley questions of state law. The issue is substantial enough to
probably require appeal or trial de novo before the district
court. The bankruptcy court cannot perform its function of
providing a speedy forum for all matters which can only be
tried in this court if it undertakes the trial of a substantial
number of matters as to which it has concurrent jurisdiction. 193
Aside from this permissive abstention, section 1334(c)(2)
mandates abstention in certain proceedings.' 94 Several require-
ments must be met before section 1334(c)(2) applies. One court
explained as follows:
(1) There must be a timely motion; (2) the proceeding must be
based upon State law; (3) the proceeding must be related to a
case under Title 11, but not arising under Title 11 or arising in
a case under Title 11; (4) the proceeding must be one which
could not have been brought in federal court absent the bank-
ruptcy proceeding; and, (5) the suit must be one which is
presently pending, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State
court. 9 1
Under the third requirement, it is clear that the mandatory
abstention provision does not apply to core proceedings. Thus,
the district courts will never be required to abstain from hearing
core issues, probably because section 1334 grants them original
jurisdiction 96
"9 45 B.R. at 996.
46 B.R. 522 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
'9' Id. at 523.
See, e.g., Macon Prestressed Concrete Co. v. Duke, 46 B.R. 727, 729 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1985) (abstention would have been mandatory but for fact that diversity
jurisdiction existed between the parties).
" Matter of Boughton, 49 B.R. at 315.
" See COLLIER, supra note 8, at 1 3.01 3][b] at 3-45 to 3-46 (neither claims brought
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One issue that has arisen falls under the fifth requirement,
that "an action is commenced and can be timely adjudicated"
in a state court. Some courts interpret this to mean that a state
action must be pending at the time of abstention. 97 In the
Boughton case, the court rejected the argument that the language
means "is commenced or can be commenced.. .in a State
forum," reasoning that had Congress wished to achieve that
meaning, it would have used that language. 19
On the other hand, some courts do accept-the above argu-
ment as the correct interpretation. 199 In In re Dakota Grain
System, Inc., the court construed the requirement to be: "if the
case were commenced in state court, it could be timely adjudi-
cated." 2w The court, however, ultimately abstained from the
debtor's breach of contract claim under permissive abstention.
20'
The case was pending at the time of the passage of the Amend-
ments and section 1334(c)(2) only applies prospectively.
202
The standard of "timely" adjudication may be very difficult
to apply, since "timely" is a relative concept. It may also be an
escape hatch for the district courts to circumvent mandatory
abstention since what may be "timely" in one case may have
no bearing on timeliness in other cases.
by creditors nor claims to adjust the automatic stay are subject to mandatory abstention
because they are core). CoLUER suggests that most cases requiring interpretation of §
1334(c)(2) will be those proceedings brought by the debtor before bankruptcy, and those
brought by the representative of the estate against third parties after bankruptcy.
See note 200 infra and accompanying text.
' 49 B.R. at 315. See also In re S.E. Hornsby & Sons Sand and Gravel Co., Inc.,
45 B.R. at 996 (section 1334(cX2) only applies if action is commenced); Ram Constr.
Co. v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 49 B.R. at 367 (section 1334(c)(2) inapplicable
since no proof that action had been commenced in state court); Matter of Climate
Control Eng's, Inc., 51 B.R. 359, 361-63 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) ("Because there is
no action commenced in state court covering the same subject matter involved in Count
I and because the power to abstain should be exercised sparingly." [sic]); Matter of
First Landmark Dev. Corp., 51 B.R. 25, 27 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) ("mandatory
abstention does not come into play unless the action involved has already been com-
menced in a non-bankruptcy forum and can be timely adjudicated there").
'9 See note 200 infra and accompanying text.
'1 41 B.R. 749, 750 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984) (emphasis added). See also State Bank
of Lombard v. Chart House, Inc., 46 B.R. 468, 471 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (quoting with
approval the Dakota Grain test).
41 B.R. at 751.
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
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CONCLUSION
The 1984 Amendments clearly demonstrate Congress' at-
tempt to comply with Northern Pipeline. First, all bankruptcy
jurisdication is orginally conferred to the district courts, and
referral to the bankruptcy courts is no longer automatic. Second,
those proceedings which are not core to the federal bankruptcy
authority, such as those found in Northern Pipeline, are subject
to de novo review by the district courts. Finally, the district
courts are empowered to withdraw any reference "for cause
shown."
Questions still exist over the effectiveness of these safe-
guards.2"3 Fear has been expressed that "Marathon II" will be
upon us any day. 204 From a perusal of the multitude of cases
decided since July, 1982, it appears, however, that many if not
most of the bankruptcy judges are interpreting the literal lan-
guage of the Amendments with an overlay of the Northern
Pipeline ruling to guide them. 2 5 This is the type of analysis
which has the best chance of succeeding against a "Marathon
II" challenge.
Laura Day Dickinson Carruthers
20 See, e.g., BKR.-L.ED., Summary § 2:14.30 ("[I]t is questionable whether [district
court's powers to revoke reverence and review de novo] constitute sufficient contitutional
safeguards." De novo review is "mere fiction" anyway with crowded district courts.);
Id. at § 2:14.28 (certain core proceedings listed in § 157(b)(2) may be insufficient to
comply with Art. III mandate); 130 CONG. REc. H7490 (daily ed. June 29, 1984)
(statement of Rep. Edwards) ("I fear that, rather than solving anything, ... we have
guaranteed that the issue will, again, soon be before us for its necessary resolution").
10 See 130 CONG. REC. H7490-91 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Edwards).
"I See BKR.-L.ED., Summary § 2:14.25, stating:
Several decisions issued shortly after adoption of the statute indicate that
it may be ill advised to consider and apply the definitions standing alone
and without considering the context out of which they arose-namely the
jurisdictional questions that have plagued the bankruptcy community for
some time now.... [S]ome courts which have considered juridictional
issues not so much by construing the language of § 157 as by looking to
underlying matters such as the dictates of Northern Pipeline or the necessity
that property of the estate be involved.
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